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Dynamic Competitive Persuasion
Mark Whitmeyer1
Abstract: We examine a dynamic game of competitive persuasion played between two long-
lived sellers over T ≤ ∞ periods. Each period, each seller provides information via a Blackwell
experiment to a single short-lived buyer, who buys from the seller whose product has the highest
expected quality. We solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, and conduct
comparative statics: in particular we find long horizons lead to less information.
Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Information Design, Martingales, Dynamic Games
JEL Classifications: C72; C73; D15; D63
1. Introduction
How does competition over the long-run shape information provision? We explore this question through
a simple model: two long-lived sellers interact over T ≤ ∞ periods and compete each period through
information provision. Each seller has a binary type or quality, represented by a Bernoulli random
variable, which corresponds to the taste of the market. This is unknown to the sellers, who each period
independently design Blackwell experiments (or signals) with the aim of enticing a sequence of short-
lived consumers, who visit each seller and observe her signal realization before purchasing from the
seller whose product has the highest expected value.
Information revelation comes at a cost: the history of experiments and signals is public, which leads
to a (martingale) sequence of beliefs. The vector of posterior beliefs from the previous period is the
state variable of the dynamic game between the senders, and we derive the unique subgame equilibrium.
Each period, the sellers choose distributions over posteriors that yield the other a continuation value
that is linear in that seller’s realized posterior belief. This linearity ensures that the other is indifferent
over the distribution she chooses, and is similar in flavor to e.g. Condorelli and Szentes (2016), where
the buyer chooses an equilibrium distribution of his valuation that generates a unit-elastic demand.
In a single period game of competitive persuasion, Au and Kawai (2017a) and Hulko and Whitmeyer
(2018) find that competition increases information provision: as the number of senders increases, each
provides more and more information (in the Blackwell sense). Moreover, in the limit, as the number of
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sellers grows to infinity, each provides full information and chooses completely informative experiments.
Here, we discover that long-horizons and patience have the opposite effect to competition: as sellers
become more patient, or as the length of the time until the game’s cessation increases, each provides
less information.
As mentioned above, the state variable of the game is the vector of priors in the current period
(x, y), where x and y are the priors for the high (mean) seller and the low (mean) seller, respectively. In
the equilibrium, in each period, the high seller chooses a distribution over posteriors with a continuous
portion on an interval [0, b], b ≤ 1; and if her mean is sufficiently high, places a point mass on 1. The
low seller does the same, with an additional weighing factor of y/x, but her distribution also has a mass
point on 0. The high seller never reveals whether she is the low type, whereas the low is forced to reveal
this on occasion.
As the sellers become perfectly patient, the equilibrium strategies converge to ones in which the high
seller chooses a distribution that consists of a point mass on her mean, and the low seller chooses a
binary distribution with weights on 0 and the high seller’s mean. In a sense, as sellers become maximally
patient, the high seller becomes completely cautious and provides no information about her product.
The low seller, on the other hand, is doomed. She chooses a binary distribution with support on 0 and
x, and with probability 1− y/x obtains 0 and loses to the high seller immediately, and forever onward.
Even if she should obtain x (with probability y/x), she would still only tie with the high seller in terms
of her expected continuation value. Conversely, as sellers become more impatient, or as the time horizon
shrinks, the range of values of means for which sellers will place a mass point on 1 increases; sellers are
more apt to “shoot” for the maximal value, and reveal that they are the high type.
Furthermore, we also ask how likely is the seller with the low mean to overtake the high seller (and
become the high seller, herself) both in the current period and at some point over the course of the
game. In a sense, how likely are consumers to change their ex ante preferences for a product over a
period of time? We find that the answer to the first question–the probability that in the current period
the low seller’s realization is higher than the high seller’s–is surprisingly static. It is merely y/(2x),
and depends only on each seller’s mean and not their discount factors or even the number of time
periods remaining. Then, as the number of periods remaining increases, the probability that the low
seller eventually overtakes the high seller (however fleetingly) increases. As the terminal time grows
infinitely far away and the sellers become completely patient, this overtaking probability converges to
y/x, the probability that the low seller does not immediately obtain a realization of 0.
1.1. Related Literature
This paper is to the author’s knowledge, the first to look at dynamic competitive persuasion. There are
however; two sub-strands of the literature that look explore its two components separately.
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On one hand, there are a number of papers that study the problem of competitive persuasion in the
single period setting. They are Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015), who solve this problem for two senders;
Albrecht (2017), who sets the two player competition in a political realm; Au and Kawai (2017b) and
Hulko and Whitmeyer (2018), who extend the analysis to n players (and in the former’s case, describe
the structure of the equilibrium for a general prior); and Au and Kawai (2017a) who allow correlation
between the types of the senders. A decade before this flurry of persuasion papers, Spiegler (2006) solves
a problem that is isomorphic to the single period competitive persuasion problem in the context of firms
choosing distributions of prices when faced with boundedly rational consumers.
There are also a number of recent papers that look at dynamic information disclosure by a single
sender to a single agent. Au (2015) explores a basic extension of the Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016)
problem to a dynamic setting: a single sender wishes an agent to take a single irreversible action and
discloses information over time in an attempt to persuade the agent to take the action. Both players
are long-lived, and he finds that with vertical information1 as the players become maximally patient,
full disclosure by the sender occurs virtually immediately. This contrasts starkly with our analysis
here: as the players become maximally patient, they become more reticent. Other papers on dynamic
information design include Guo and Shmaya (2018), who generalize Au (2015) and allow for correlated
sender and receiver types; and Ely (2017), who explores information provided by a principal who has
access to a privately evolving state. Two additional papers that investigate similar models of persuasion
by a principal in a changing world (the state is dynamic) are Renault et al. (2017), and Ball (2018).
Other papers that explore a real-option like scenario are Bizzotto et al. (2015), and Orlov et al. (2019),
who look at similar scenarios in which a receiver must choose when to choose an irreversible action. In
the latter paper, as in Au (2015), the incentives and parameters may be such that all information may
be disclosed immediately.
The competitive aspect inherent to this setting drastically alters the problem of the persuaders. If,
in this paper, there were instead just one sender, the problem would be trivial–the consumer would buy
from that sender each period. Hence, the results here are driven entirely by the competitive circum-
stances the sellers find themselves in. This leads to dramatically different optimal (equilibrium) policies.
Purely atomic distributions of posteriors (posterior means) are never optimal in the competitive case,
except in the completely patient, infinite-time-horizon limit, since a competitor can always deviate by
“over-cutting” with information. This eliminates both completely informative and completely uninfor-
mative signals. Instead, as mentioned in the introduction, each seller chooses distributions that yield
each other a continuation value that is linear in that seller’s realized posterior belief.
1By vertical information Au denotes the scenario in which the receiver’s utility from taking the action is increasing in
the state of the world.
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2. The Model
Time is discrete, indexed by the natural numbers, with a final time period T ≤ ∞. There are two long-
lived sellers and T short-lived consumers, who have identical preferences. Each seller has a binary type,
represented by the Bernoulli random variable {0, 1}. Let x1 (y1) denote the prior probability before the
game begins that seller 1 (2) is high quality. Note that we do not impose that x1 = y1.
In each period, a single risk-neutral consumer visits both sellers. The sellers do not compete on price
but instead on information: the buyer buys from the seller whose product has the highest expected
quality. Each period, without knowing her (or the other seller’s) type, each seller chooses a Blackwell
experiment conditioned on her type, which realization is public. The buyer observes the realization of
the two experiments and buys from the seller whose signal realization begets the highest expected value
for the product (and randomizes fairly over the two sellers, should the expected value for both be the
same). We normalize the reward to a seller from being chosen to 1, and to 0 from not being chosen.
The two sellers discount the future by β ≤ 1.
Each seller has a compact metric space of signal realizations S, and each period, t, the sellers in-
dependently choose signals conditioned on the current vector of means (xt, yt). A signal is a Borel
measurable function pii(xt, yt) :
{
0, 1
}→ ∆(S), i = 1, 2. For seller 1 (and analogously for seller 2), each
signal realization, s1, leads to a posterior distribution Gs1 ∈ ∆
({
0, 1
})
with the corresponding posterior
means x2(s1). Accordingly, the signal leads to a distribution over posterior means, τi ∈ ∆(x2(s1)).
The following result is nearly ubiquitous in this literature:
Lemma 2.1. For seller 1, the choice of signal pi1(xt, yt) is equivalent to a choice of distribution Fi
supported on [0, 1] with mean xt, and symmetrically for seller 2 (in which case the mean is yt).
Proof. As noted by Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), the choice of signal provision by a seller is equivalent
to the choice of a feasible distribution of posterior means. Elton and Hill (1992) show that if the prior
is a Bernoulli distribution, then the set of all such feasible distributions is the set of all distributions on
[0, 1] with mean xt. 
Consequently, we can rephrase each seller’s problem as follows. In period 1, seller 1 chooses a random
variable X1 distributed according to (Borel) probability distribution F1 supported on [0, 1] with mean
x1, and seller 2 a random variable Y1 distributed according to G1 supported on [0, 1] with mean y1.
This is done simultaneously, after which the two values of the random variables are realized.
The seller whose random variable has the highest realization “wins” and receives a prize that we
normalize to 1, and the loser receives 0. Denote the respective realizations x2 and y2. Period 1 ends and
the sellers proceed on to period 2. As in the first period, each seller chooses a distribution with new
mean constraints of x2, and y2. Again, the seller with the highest realization wins a prize of 1, and the
loser 0. The same procedure occurs for the third period, the fourth, and so on, until period T occurs,
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after which the game ends.
As a result, we have sequences of random variables
(
(X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . , (XT , YT )
)
; distributions,(
(F1, G1), (F2, G2), . . . , (FT , GT )
)
; and means,
(
(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xT , yT )
)
. Given our construction,
we have for both X and Y , E[Xt+1|X1, X2, . . . , Xt] = Xt, and E[Yt+1|Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt] = Yt–each sequence
of random variables is a martingale and this is a “game of martingales”.
This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which we derive through backward induction.
Moreover, in each period, a seller’s strategy depends only on her mean, her opponent’s mean and
the number of time periods remaining. Hence, we drop the subscripts and instead write each seller’s
strategy as a function of her mean, her opponent’s mean, and τ , the number of periods until the game’s
termination.
2.1. The Unique Equilibrium
We present the following theorem and several corollaries. Without loss of generality we may impose that
x ≥ y for the “current” period. Denote the final period by T , and for each period t define τ := T − t+1,
which denotes the number of periods left until the game ends.
Theorem 2.2. Define
µ :=
√
1−βτ
1−β√
1−βτ
1−β + 1
The unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is, with τ periods remaining
1. If x ≤ µ, seller 1 chooses the random variable X ∼ F and seller 2 chooses the random variable
Y ∼ G where F and G are defined as
F (w) =

0 w < 0
kw
√
1−βτ
1−β 0 ≤ w ≤ b
1 b ≤ w
, G(z) =

0 z < 0
1− yx + yxkz
√
1−βτ
1−β 0 ≤ z ≤ b
1 b ≤ z
where
b = x
√
1−βτ
1−β + 1√
1−βτ
1−β
, k =
1
b
√
1−βτ
1−β
2. If x ≥ µ, seller 1 chooses the random variable X ∼ F and seller 2 chooses the random variable
Y ∼ G where F and G are defined as
F (w) =

0 w < 0
sw
√
1−βτ
1−β 0 ≤ w < c
1 c ≤ w
, G(z) =

0 z < 0
1− yx + yxsz
√
1−βτ
1−β 0 ≤ z < c
1 c ≤ z
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Fig 1. seller 1 Equilibrium Distributions for β = .4, .6 & .8; x = .4; and τ = 10
where
c =
(1− x)
(
1 + (1− β)
√
βτ−1
β−1 − βτ
)
1 + (x− 1)βτ − xβ , s =
1− a
c
√
1−βτ
1−β
, a = 2− 1
x
− (β − β
τ ) (1− x)2
(1− β)x
(1)
Each seller’s payoff is given by:
u1 =
1− βτ
1− β
(
1− y
2x
)
, u2 =
1− βτ
1− β
(
y
2x
)
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium distributions for seller 1 for x = .4, τ = 10, and three different
values of β: .4, .6, and .8.
We relegate the full proof of Theorem 2.2 to Appendix A, and instead briefly discuss the structure of
the proof. That these distributions constitute an equilibrium is simple, and may be shown directly. We
establish that this is the unique SPE through judicious use of techniques from the calculus of variations:
we define the appropriate functional, J(g), and solve the second seller’s maximization problem, who
chooses a density, g, in order to maximize J(g). This yields a distribution, F , for the first seller that
leaves the second seller indifferent over her choice of distribution in the form of an integro-differential
equation. The unique distribution that solves this while satisfying the mean constraint constitutes the
equilibrium distribution for seller 1; and we carry out the same procedure to obtain seller 2’s equilibrium
distribution. See Figure 2 for a simulation of a sequence of equilibrium means of the game for T = 14.
While the precise functional form may seem at first glance dauntingly un-intuitive, the justifications
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Fig 2. An Equilibrium Sequence of Means
for its appearance should quickly clear up such concerns. The continuous portion of the distribution
chosen by the first seller, say, is of the form that begets a continuation value for the second sender that
is linear in her realized posterior belief. This linearity ensures that the second sender is indifferent over
the distribution she chooses, so she is willing to choose a distribution that leaves the first seller, herself,
indifferent over her choice of distribution.
Moreover, the forms of c and s follow from the fact that for x > µ, seller 1’s distribution (and hence
seller 2’s distribution as well) must have an atom on 1, in order to head off the possibility that seller 2
could deviate profitably by choosing a Bernoulli distribution with mean y. Proposition A.6, infra, details
this in full. Then, given this atom, c and s follow from the mean constraint and the constraint that
F is a cdf. That the equilibrium distributions must be atomless (except possibly at 1 for both sellers
and 0 for seller 2) follow from an argument analogous to the standard price under-cutting argument in
industrial organization; see e.g. Stahl (1989).
2.2. Properties of the Equilibrium
Recall that we say that for distributions H and Hˆ with the same mean, Hˆ second-order stochastically
dominates H if
∫ t
0
H(w)dw ≥ ∫ t
0
Hˆ(w)dw for every t ≥ 0, or equivalently H is a mean preserving spread
of Hˆ. Our first result concerns the level of information provided by the sellers, and how that is affected
by changes in the parameters β and τ .
Proposition 2.3. As β and τ increase, the equilibrium strategies chosen by sellers become less risky.
That is, if βˆ ≥ β and τˆ > τ then the equilibrium distributions chosen by each seller for parameters
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βˆ and τˆ second-order stochastically dominate the equilibrium distributions chosen by each seller for
parameters β and τ .
Proof. Fix means x ≥ y, and without loss of generality focus on seller 1. We give the proof for the case
in which x ≤ µ. The case in which x > µ may be proved in virtually identical fashion. First, note that
we may rewrite b as
b =
x√
1−βτ
1−β
+ x
Accordingly,
∂b
∂β
= −x (β
τ ((τ − 1)β − τ) + β)
2 (β − 1)2 β
(
βτ−1
β−1
)3/2 < 0 (2)
and
∂b
∂τ
=
βτ ln (β)x
2 (1− β)
(
1−βτ
1−β
)3/2 < 0 (3)
That is, the support of the distribution is shrinking as τ and β increase. Next, defineH as the equilibrium
distribution for seller 1 corresponding to some τ and β. Let Hˆ be the equilibrium distribution for seller
1 corresponding to some arbitrary τˆ and βˆ with τˆ ≥ τ and βˆ ≥ β. From expressions 2 and 3 we see
that bˆ ≤ b. Hence, ∫ b
0
Hˆ(w)dw =
∫ bˆ
0
Hˆ(w)dw + (b− bˆ)
Claim 2.4. ∫ b
0
Hˆ(w)dw =
∫ b
0
H(w)dw
Proof. We have ∫ b
0
Hˆ(w)dw =
∫ bˆ
0
Hˆ(w)dw + (b− bˆ)
= x
1√
1−βˆτˆ
1−βˆ
+ b− bˆ
= x
1√
1−βτ
1−β
=
∫ b
0
H(w)dw

Since the two functions are equal at b and have the same slope thereafter, they are equal for all
t ≥ b. Next, write H(w) and Hˆ(w) as kwγ and kˆwγˆ , respectively. Simple calculus verifies that k < kˆ
and γˆ > γ. Accordingly, there is some point 0 < w0 < 1 such that H(w0) = Hˆ(w0) and H(w) > Hˆ(w)
for all 0 < w < w0 and
H(w) < Hˆ(w) (4)
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for all w0 < w < b, where w0 =
(
k
kˆ
)1/(γˆ−γ)
. Thus,
∫ t
0
H(w)dw >
∫ t
0
Hˆ(w)dw for all 0 < t < w0.
From claim 2.4 we have
∫ w0
0
H(w)dw − ∫ w0
0
Hˆ(w)dw =
∫ b
w0
Hˆ(w)dw − ∫ b
w0
H(w)dw. Hence, from
expression 4
∫ t
w0
Hˆ(w)dw − ∫ t
w0
H(w)dw <
∫ w0
0
H(w)dw − ∫ w0
0
Hˆ(w)dw for all w0 ≤ t < b, and the
result follows. 
Thus, as sellers become more patient, or as the time horizon increases, they provide less information
about their products to the consumer. The consumer is made worse off by a longer time horizon and
by more patient sellers.
Next, it proves illuminating to investigate the properties of the cutoff µ. In particular, we examine
the effect of a change in β or τ on µ. First, β,
∂µ
∂β
=
βτ−1 ((τ − 1)β − τ) + 1
2 (β − 1)2
(√
βτ−1
β−1 + 1
)2√
βτ−1
β−1
> 0
Thus, as sellers become more patient, µ increases. In the limit, as both sellers become maximally
patient, we have
lim
β→1
µ =
√
τ
1 +
√
τ
This expression goes to 1 as τ goes to infinity. Hence, for maximally patient sellers, as the terminal
time becomes infinitely far away, µ goes to 1 and each seller’s strategy is dictated by the first part of
Theorem 2.2. Pausing to double check that the order of limits is nothing to worry about (we’re safe),
we next look at the structure of the distributions in this limit.
In the limit (as τ → ∞ and β → 1), b goes to x; hence the distribution converges to one in which
the seller with the highest mean puts a point mass of weight 1 on x and the other seller puts weight
y/x on x and 1 − y/x on 0. Intuitively, this makes sense, as the time horizon becomes infinite, sellers
become more conservative, and in the the limit take no risks whatsoever.
We also look at the effect of an increase in τ on µ:
∂µ
∂τ
=
βτ ln (β)
2 (β − 1)
(√
1−βτ
1−β + 1
)2√
1−βτ
1−β
> 0
As the length of time until the final period T increases, the crucial value, µ, increases and in the limit
lim
τ→∞µ =
1
1 +
√
1− β
In addition, note that if a seller achieves a realization of mean 0 or 1, she must choose either 0 or 1
(respectively) with probability one in each successive period. Should one seller achieve a realization of
1, then the next period the other seller must either obtain a realization of 0 or 1. Over the T period
game it is impossible for both sellers to reach state 0, though it is possible for neither seller to reach
either absorbing state.
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One additional question that naturally arises concerns how entrenched the positions of the sellers
are. That is, we may ask; how likely is the seller with the lower mean in one period to have the higher
mean in the period immediately afterward? The answer is surprising:
Corollary 2.5. At equilibrium, the probability that seller 2 will have a (weakly) higher mean than seller
1 in the next period is y2x if x ≤ µ and yx · a
2+1
2 , where a is as given in expression 1, if x > µ.
Proof. First let x ≤ µ. Then Pr(Y > X) = ∫ b
0
F (z)dG(z), which may be reduced directly to obtain the
result. If x > µ then Pr(Y > X) =
∫ b
0
F (z)dG(z) + yxa(1 − a) + yxa2, where a is the size of the point
mass that seller 1 places on 1. This reduces to yx · a
2+1
2 . 
Note that the only reason why the probability of a change in order is different for x > µ is because
of the tie break rule. That is, if we were to subtract (y/x) · (a2/2) from the above probability for x > µ
we would obtain y/(2x), as in the x ≤ µ case. In some sense, this result is curious. Despite the dynamic
nature of the game this overtaking probability is remarkably static–it depends neither on the sellers’
discount factors nor on the time horizon. In addition, the following corollary is also evident:
Corollary 2.6. As τ increases, the probability that seller 2 will have a higher mean than seller 1 at
some point (seller 2 “overtakes” seller 1, so-to-speak) increases. In the limit, as τ → ∞ and β → 1,
this probability goes to y/x.
Proof. To see this, observe that this probability can be written recursively as
K(y, x, τ) =
y
2x
+
(
1− y
2x
)
EF,G[K(y, x, τ − 1)]
where K(y, x, τ) is a random variable giving the probability that seller 2 overtakes 1 at some point
given that there are τ many more periods. This expression is clearly increasing in τ . Finally, our earlier
analysis of the limiting behavior of the distribution yielded the fact that seller 2 will choose a binary
distribution that consists of x with probability y/x and 0 with 1 − y/x, and seller 1 the distribution
that consists of a single mass point on x. Hence, with probability y/x, seller 2 will (weakly) overtake
seller 1 immediately, and with probability 1− y/x, seller 2 will never overtake seller 1. 
Finally, we can look at the point mass that is (possibly) placed on 1 at equilibrium.2 Recall that this
point mass a∗ is given by
a∗ = 2− 1
x
− (β − β
τ ) (1− x)2
(1− β)x
Then,
∂a∗
∂τ
=
βτ ln (β) (1− x)2
(1− β)x < 0
and
∂a∗
∂β
= − (1− x)
2
(βτ ((τ − 1)β − τ) + β)
x (1− β)2 β < 0
2By seller 1. seller 2’s point mass will be the same, weighted by y/x.
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We see that as τ increases, or as β increases, the mass point on 1 decreases. As noted above, for any
means, there are some threshold values of β and τ , above which there will be no mass points on 1.
3. Discussion
The sellers in this paper face a challenging problem. Each period, they are tasked with designing an
experiment to sway the buyer to their own product, yet the realization of the experiment is fully
observable and so will affect the future beliefs of each subsequent consumer. Because of these dynamic
concerns, the sellers become more reticent, in comparison to the single period problem. As the time
horizon grows, and as the sellers become more patient, they choose distributions that are more and more
uninformative–the downside of a bad realization is just too great, since the entire stream of continuation
payoffs will be hurt should bad news arrive.
The rationale behind the form taken by the equilibrium distributions is perhaps unsurprising. The
game is a constant-sum game, and so each seller’s choice of distribution is predicated on the notion of
leaving the other seller indifferent over the distribution she, herself, chooses. What distribution is that?
The distribution that results in a continuation payoff for the other seller that is linear in its realization.
What is surprising, or at least not readily apparent, is the static nature of the overtaking probability
at equilibrium. It depends only on the sellers’ current means and not on the discount factor or even the
number of periods left. Ultimately, it follows from the linearity of the continuation payoffs.
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Appendix A: Theorem 2.2. Proof
First, we present the following lemma from Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015):
Lemma A.1. (Lemma 4.1. in Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015)) Let τ = 1. The unique Nash Equilibrium
is as follows:
1. If x ≤ 1/2, seller 1 chooses the random variable X ∼ F and seller 2 chooses the random variable
Y ∼ G where F and G are defined as
F (w) =

0 w < 0
w
2x 0 ≤ w ≤ 2x
1 2x ≤ w
, G(z) =

0 z < 0
1− yx +
(
y
x
)
z
2x 0 ≤ z ≤ 2x
1 2x ≤ z
2. If x ≥ 1/2, seller 1 chooses the random variable X ∼ F and seller 2 chooses the random variable
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Y ∼ G where F and G are defined as
F (w) =

0 w < 0
w
2x 0 ≤ w < 2(1− x)
1 2(1− x) ≤ w
, G(z) =

0 z < 0
1− yx +
(
y
x
)
z
2x 0 ≤ z < 2(1− x)
1 2(1− x) ≤ z
The vector of payoffs is
(
1− y2x , y2x
)
.
Proof. See Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015). 
Armed with this result, we work our way backward and examine the two period case.
A.1. Two Periods Remaining
As a result of Lemma A.1, given discount factor β ≤ 1 and the period two payoffs under the equilibrium,
seller 1’s period 1 payoff can be written as:
Pr[Y < X] + β Pr[X > Y ]E
[
1− Y
2X
∣∣∣∣X > Y ]+ β Pr[Y > X]E[ X2Y
∣∣∣∣X < Y ] (5)
which reduces to
(1 + β)
∫ 1
0
G(w)dF (w)− β
∫ 1
0
∫ w
0
z
2w
dG(z)dF (w) + β
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
w
w
2z
dG(z)dF (w) (6)
We define
µˆ :=
√
1 + β√
1 + β + 1
and write the following proposition:
Proposition A.2. Let x = µˆ. Then the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is,
1. Seller 1 chooses the distribution F (w) = w
√
1+β supported on [0, 1];
2. Seller 2 chooses the distribution G(z) =
(
y
x
)
z
√
1+β supported on [0, 1], and places a point mass of
weight
(
1− yx
)
on 0.
The resulting vector of payoffs is
(
(1 + β)(1− y2x ), (1 + β) y2x
)
.
Proof. First, we establish sufficiency in the following Lemma:
Lemma A.3. The pair of distributions described in Theorem A.2 is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
Proof. Direct verification suffices. Suppose seller 2 chooses distribution G(z) = z
√
1+β supported on
[0, 1] and places a point mass of weight
(
1− yx
)
on 0 and seller 1 deviates to any other distribution F .
Define k := (1 + β)
(
1− yx
)
. Hence, seller 1’s utility from this deviation is
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u1 =
(
y
x
)(
(1 + β)
∫ 1
0
w
√
1+βdF (w)− β
√
1 + β
2
∫ 1
0
∫ w
0
z
√
1+β
w
dzdF (w)
)
−
(
y
x
)(
β
√
1 + β
2
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
w
wz
√
1+β−2dzdF (w)
)
+ k
(7)
This reduces to u1 = (1 + β)
(
1 − y2x
)
, which is seller 1’s payoff under the equilibrium. Thus, she has
no profitable deviation. The analogous argument (without the k term) may be used for seller 2 to show
that she has no profitable deviation.
Note that in this case, as in each subsequent proof of sufficiency infra, it suffices to verify that there
is no profitable deviation to any binary distribution. This follows from Corollary 1.7 in Whitmeyer and
Whitmeyer (2019). 
Lemma A.4. Any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium must be those described in Proposition A.2.
Establishing necessity is a little more involved: fixing F , seller 2 chooses a density g in order to
maximize expression 6. To that end, we define the functional J [g] as the Euler Lagrange equation
J [g] = (1 + β)
∫ 1
0
F (z)g(z)dz − β
∫ 1
0
∫ z
0
w
2z
dF (w)g(z)dz + β
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
z
z
2w
dF (w)g(z)dz
− λ0
[ ∫ 1
0
g(z)dz − 1
]
− λ
[ ∫ 1
0
zg(z)dz − y
]
where the two constraints, λ0 and λ, are needed in order to ensure that G is a distribution with mean
y. Next, we can solve this problem by searching for a function g such that the value of this functional is
extremal compared to other functions nearby. In other words, we aim to compute a necessary condition
that must be satisfied by the optimal g. The fact that there are no g′ terms in this functional is helpful
indeed, and it is a standard result (see Gelfand and Fomin (1963)) that for the functional gradient (or
variational derivative) we have
δJ
δg
=
∂Γ
∂p
− d
dz
∂Γ
∂p′
where Γ is the expression in J [g] that is being integrated and p := g(z). Hence,
δJ
δg
= (1 + β)F (z)− β
∫ z
0
w
2z
dF (w) + β
∫ 1
z
z
2w
dF (w)− λ0 − λz
Any critical function g is one that by definition has a vanishing functional gradient; thus we set the
above expression equal to 0:
(1 + β)F (z)− β
∫ z
0
w
2z
dF (w) + β
∫ 1
z
z
2w
dF (w) = λz + λ0
Next, we solve this integro-differential equation for F . Differentiating with respect to z and rearranging
thrice, we obtain the following differential equation
3zF ′′ + z2F ′′′ − βF ′ = 0
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Hence,
F (w) =
1√
1 + β
[
C1w
√
1+β + C2w
−√1+β
]
+ C3
for constants C1, C2 and C3. Since F (0) = 0, we must have C2 = C3 = 0. Moreover, since F (1) = 1, we
have
C1√
1 + β
= 1
Thus, we have F (w) = w
√
1+β and f(w) =
√
1 + βw
√
1+β−1. F must also satisfy
x =
∫ 1
0
√
1 + βw
√
1+βdw =
√
1 + β√
1 + β + 1
which holds by assumption. For seller 2 it is easy to see that the support of the distribution is [0, 1] and
that the functional form G(z) = mz
√
1+β . Accordingly, we must have
y =
∫ 1
0
m
√
1 + βz
√
1+βdz = mx
and so m = y/x. Since G(1) = 1, there must be a point mass of weight
(
1 − yx
)
on 0. Finally, we
calculate each seller’s expected payoff directly and obtain vector
(
(1 + β)(1− y2x ), (1 + β) y2x
)
. 
Proposition A.5. Let x < µˆ. Then the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is,
1. Seller 1 chooses the distribution F (w) = ζw
√
1+β supported on [0, b] where
b =
x
(√
1 + β + 1
)
√
1 + β
, ζ =
1
b
√
1+β
2. Seller 2 chooses the distribution G(z) =
(
y
x
)
ζz
√
1+β supported on [0, b], and places a point mass
of weight
(
1− yx
)
on 0.
Proof. Proof of necessity is analogous to that for Theorem A.2 and so is omitted. We establish sufficiency.
Suppose seller 2 chooses distributionG(z) = ζz
√
1+β supported on [0, b] and places a point mass of weight(
1 − yx
)
on 0 and seller 1 deviates to any other distribution F . Define k := (1 + β)
(
1 − yx
)
. seller 1’s
utility from this deviation is
u1 =
∫ 1
0
∫ w
0
dG(z)dF (w) + β
∫ 1
0
∫ w
0
(
1− z
2w
)
dG(z)dF (w) + β
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
w
w
2z
dG(z)dF (w) + k
Direct verification establishes that this expression is no greater than (1 + β)
(
1 − y2x
)
. The analogous
argument (without the k term) may be used for seller 2 to show that she has no profitable deviation. 
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Now, we have the following proposition:
Proposition A.6. Let x > µˆ. Then, at equilibrium there must be a point mass on 1 of size a played
by seller 1, where a satisfies
a =
2x− 1− β(1− x)2
x
Proof. This result follows from the following pair of lemmata
Lemma A.7.
a ≥ 2x− 1− β(1− x)
2
x
Proof. Suppose seller 2 chooses a binary distribution that consists of two point masses of weight y on
1 and 1 − y on 0. seller 1 plays a distribution that consists of a point mass of weight a on 1 and a
continuous portion with distribution F (w) on [0, b], b ≤ 1. Accordingly, seller 2’s payoff is
u2 = (1 + β)
ya
2
+ y(1− a) + βy
∫ b
0
(
1− w
2
)
dF (w)
This must be less than or equal to (1 + β)y/2x. Hence,
a ≥ 2x− 1− β(1− x)
2
x

Alternatively, we can determine the size of the point mass, a, and the upper bound of the continuous
portion of the distribution, b, by solving for a and b that would leave the other seller indifferent over
the size of the point mass that she places on 1 given that the rest of her distribution has support on
[0, b].
Lemma A.8.
a ≤ 2x− 1− β(1− x)
2
x
Proof. Suppose seller 2 chooses a binary distribution that consists of two point masses of weight p on
b and 1− p on 0,3 where b is defined as
b :=
(
x− a
1− a
)
1 +
√
1 + β√
1 + β
3Note that it is either possible to do this, or if the mean is too high, then instead seller 2 can choose a binary
distribution that consists of two point masses of weight p on b and 1− p on 1, and the argument proceeds in precisely the
same manner.
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seller 1 plays a distribution that consists of a point mass of weight a on 1 and a continuous portion
with distribution F (w) on [0, b]. Accordingly, seller 2’s payoff is
u2 = pF (b) + β
apb
2
+ βp
∫ b
0
(
1− z
2b
)
dF (z)
which reduces to
u2 =
y(a2 + a(β(x− 2)− 2) + β + 1)
2(x− a)
Now, u2 ≤ (1 + β) y2x if and only if
y(a2 + a(β(x− 2)− 2) + β + 1)
2(x− a) ≤ (1 + β)
y
2x
ay(ax+ βx2 − 2βx+ β − 2x+ 1) ≤ 0
Take the first order condition with respect to a, yielding
a∗ =
2x− 1− β(1− x)2
x
= 2− 1
x
− β(1− x)
2
x
Moreover, the second derivative of the left hand side is strictly positive, hence it is strictly convex. Thus,
the unique minimizer of the left hand side is at a∗. Substituting this in to u2, we obtain (1 + β) y2x .
Hence, we cannot have a ≥ 2x−1−β(1−x)2x and the result is shown. 
The proposition immediately follows. 
Finally, the equilibrium characterization:
Proposition A.9. Let x > µˆ. Then the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is,
1. Seller 1 chooses the distribution with a mass point of weight a on 1 and a continuous portion,
F (w) = κw
√
1+β supported on [0, b] where
a = 2− 1
x
− β(1− x)
2
x
, b =
(1 + β +
√
1 + β)(1− x)
1 + β(1− x) , κ =
1− a
b
√
1+β
2. Seller 2 chooses the distribution with a mass point of weight yxa on 1 and a continuous portion,
G(z) =
(
y
x
)
κz
√
1+β supported on [0, b], and places a point mass of weight
(
1− yx
)
on 0.
Proof. Again, proof of necessity is analogous to that for Theorem A.2 and so is omitted. Sufficiency
follows through direct verification ut supra. 
As we will see in the next subsection, the heavy lifting is done, and it is simple to proceed backwards
and derive the equilibrium for an arbitrary τ .
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A.2. τ Periods Remaining
Recall
µ :=
√
1−βτ
1−β√
1−βτ
1−β + 1
Proposition A.10. Let x = µ. Then the unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium is,
1. Seller 1 chooses the distribution F (w) = w
√
1−βτ
1−β supported on [0, 1];
2. Seller 2 chooses the distribution G(z) = (y/x)z
√
1−βτ
1−β supported on [0, 1], and places a point mass
of weight 1− y/x on 0.
Proof. First we prove necessity:
Lemma A.11. Any equilibrium must satisfy the conditions given in Theorem A.10.
Proof. Our proof is through induction. We know that for τ = 1, 2 the unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium and the resulting payoff for each of the sellers is that presented in Theorem A.10. Suppose that
for τ − 1 the equilibrium and payoff are as given above. This is equivalent to saying that each seller, in
the subgame commencing in period 2 achieves equilibrium payoffs of
u1 =
1− βτ−1
1− β
(
1− y
2x
)
, u2 =
1− βτ−1
1− β
(
y
2x
)
Accordingly, in period 1, seller 1’s payoff can be written as
Pr[Y < X] + γ Pr[X > Y ]E
[
1− Y
2X
∣∣∣∣X > Y ]+ γ Pr[Y > X]E[ X2Y
∣∣∣∣X < Y ] (8)
where
γ = β
1− βτ−1
1− β (9)
But, Expression 8 is virtually identical to Expression 5, with γ instead of β. Solving in the same
manner, we see that we have F (w) = w
√
1+γ = w
√
1−βτ
1−β and f(w) =
√
1−βτ
1−β w
√
1−βτ
1−β −1. It is easy to
verify the value of x as well as each seller’s payoff. 
Next, we show sufficiency
Lemma A.12. The pair of distributions described in Theorem A.10 is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose seller 2 chooses distribution G(z) = z
√
1+γ (where γ is given in Expression 9) supported
on [0, 1] and places a point mass of weight (1− y/x) on 0 and seller 1 deviates to any other distribution
F . Define j := (1 + γ)(1− y/x). Then, seller 1’s utility from this deviation is
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u1 =
(
y
x
)(
(1 + γ)
∫ 1
0
w
√
1+γdF (w)− γ
√
1 + γ
2
∫ 1
0
∫ w
0
z
√
1+γ
w
dzdF (w)
)
−
(
y
x
)(
γ
√
1 + γ
2
∫ 1
0
∫ w
0
wz
√
1+γ−2dzdF (w)
)
+ j
(10)
But, Expression 10 is virtually identical to Expression 7, with γ instead of β and j instead of k, and
following the same steps, it is easy to see that there is no profitable deviation for either seller. 
Our proof is complete.

The remainder of the proof of Theorem 2.2, for cases x > µ and x < µ, is completed analogously,
replacing β with γ, and following the steps from the previous subsection as in Proposition A.10.

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